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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper I explore the notion of epistemic injustice in relation to privilege, marginalization, and 
oppression. I define epistemic injustice as anytime marginalized bodies are denied credibility based 
solely on their status as that Other. Conversely, epistemic privilege occurs whenever those in power are 
given credibility based solely on their elevated or authoritative status within society. It is my claim that 
epistemic injustice is not just a problem of knowing and that it reaches far beyond the scope of traditional 
epistemology and roots itself in both the social and political. It is, at a fundamental level, a tool used to 
control and oppresses already marginalized populations. I utilize the Puerto Rican Pill Trials that took 
place from 1952-1960 in order to expand upon the notion of epistemic injustice and the destruction of 
word-of-mouth testimony among groups of marginalized bodies. Along with this I assert that epistemic 
injustice has drastic consequences and is not just a problem of knowing. These consequences are two-
fold. One, the denial of recognition from oneself and one’s peers, and two, the inability to engage in the 
introspective process of creating one’s subjecthood.  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
Epistemology and political philosophy share a deep connection, one that is often 
overlooked by traditional conceptions of what epistemology should be. Accounts of 
theories of knowledge that focus specifically on abstracted Truth, justified true belief, and 
reaching universal maxims of knowledge through logical analysis are, in some cases, very 
useful tools that philosophy helps cultivate. However, focusing on knowledge as something 
that is strictly theoretical can create problems and leave our empirical understanding of the 
world lacking of substance. Abstract understandings of knowledge and the quest for a 
universal maxim of Truth often shroud the importance that epistemology can have when it 
is positioned within the real and social world as we experience it. In fact, to separate our 
understandings of power from our understandings of knowledge is defeating. The two are 
interconnected and inseparable in almost every circumstance. As Miranda Fricker argues in 
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Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege,” the powerful have some sort of unfair 
advantage in ‘structuring’ our understanding of the social world.”1 It is because those 
directly in relation with the central power do have the ability to structure the rest of the 
world around them that the connection between epistemology and political philosophy 
should be explored in great detail.  
 
Not only is the world structured by those in power, but also by the knowledge that is 
held as valid and “true” within their society is solely controlled by a select few. This 
monopolization of knowledge is not only oppressive, but creates epistemic injustice and 
furthers marginalization within groups of bodies that have already been labeled as on 
the “fringe.” It destroys potential for word of mouth testimony from the groups that are 
furthest from the central focus of power, denies recognition by one’s greater epistemic 
community, and aids in the creation of further oppression to take place that is not 
specifically epistemological.  
 
The heart of oppression lies in epistemological constraints that are placed upon 
populations of already marginalized bodies. Fringe groups further in difference from the 
central power and further outside the normative views of citizenship often have their 
credibility destroyed by the central power itself. Not only are marginalized voices 
typically not taken into consideration but—when they are heard, which is only a fraction 
of the time—their reliability is diminished simply because they belong to a particular 
marginalized group. Marginalized bodies do not experience the same type of epistemic 
privilege that those of us closer to the central power do. Credibility is destroyed, 
testimony ignored, and even expert knowledge is dismissed as meaningless and 
insignificant. Practices of systemic oppression often aim to destroy credibility and word 
of mouth testimony altogether, denying the subject the ability to be an epistemic agent.  
 
This denial lies largely in Western society’s obsession with both recognition and 
individuality. Recognition is only easily attainable for those closer to the central 
power—primarily those who find themselves in a position of privilege or dominance. 
Individuality, similarly, is a luxury only given to those who can be recognized by their 
larger community, a recognition that is often given only through epistemological 
respect. By individuality I do not mean a single person alienated from the greater 
world. The notion of an abstract, self-sufficient subject is not the kind of individualism 
with which I am concerned. Instead, by individuality, I mean and understanding of 
subjecthood—an ascription of self-determination that lies in the presupposition that all 
persons are fundamentally equal and have the ability to cultivate virtues and flourish 
                                                          
1 Fricker, Miranda. “Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic Privilege.” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 25 (1999): 191-210. Accessed October 28, 2014. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1999.10716836.  
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under a well-ordered society. When epistemic respect is denied, it necessarily follows 
that recognition does not, and cannot, take place. Since critical and rational thought are 
often seen as fundamental to the human experience, we can also say that being able to 
express that thought, and have it believed, is just as fundamental. When we are denied 
this expression, this epistemic respect of our peers, we are often devalued as knowers, 
rejected by our epistemic community, and, therefore, denied aspects of subjecthood.  
 
 
I. Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Privilege  
 
Epistemic injustice takes place whenever those in power are given credibility based 
solely on their status within society or when marginalized bodies are denied credibility 
based solely on their status as that Other. This is a phenomenon asserted by Miranda 
Fricker in her 1998 article Rational Authority and Social Power. The connection 
between the epistemological and the political is prevalent in Fricker’s work. She asserts 
that the political character of a subject is derived from”the fact that epistemic subjects 
are socially constituted individuals who stand in relations of power.”2 Individual 
subjects interact with the world around them, a world that is constituted of social 
structures and power relations, and a world in which oppression is a constant, 
potentially even a fundamental aspect of society. Because essentialist claims about the 
human species assert that we are rational and analytic beings, it follows that one of our 
primary concerns is, in fact, acquiring knowledge. It also follows that, not only do we 
wish to gain knowledge, we wish to have our claims assessed as valid or at least taken 
into consideration. 
 
It is my claim that epistemic injustice is not just a problem of knowing. It reaches far 
beyond the scope of traditional epistemology and roots itself in the world that we, as 
social beings, interact with. The very notion of epistemic injustice comes from the 
central power’s ability to deny credibility and respect to specific groups within society; 
therefore, its very existence is systemic and is a flaw of the structure of society. It is, at 
a fundamental level, a tool used to control and oppresses already marginalized 
populations. While those who constantly find their status as a knowledge claimant 
diminished, and in some cases even destroyed, suffer from epistemic injustice; those 
who are in a position of power and status consistently experience epistemic privilege. 
Their claims of knowing are taken at face value simply because they are in the correct 
position to be believed.   
 
                                                          
2 Fricker, Miranda. “Rational Authority and Social Power: Towards a Truly Social 
Epistemology.” Proceedings from the Aristotelean Society, New Proceedings 98 (1998): 159-77. 
Accessed November 9, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545280. 
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As Bat-Ami Bar On points out in Marginality and Epistemic Privilege, when we take 
sociopolitical theory into account when assessing epistemic injustice, those that 
consistently find themselves in positions of privilege with relation to their knowledge 
claims are those that are positions of authority.3 Meaning, the closer to the central 
power one finds themselves, the more credibility their knowledge claims are given. 
Conversely, the further one finds themselves from the central power, the less credibility 
their knowledge claims are given. This becomes extremely important when attempting 
to induce any sort of social change. It is usually the voices of the marginalized that have 
the most important things to say, the voices that should be taken into consideration 
because of their personal and cultural experiences of oppression; however, they are also 
the voices that are silenced based on their marginality alone.   
 
 
II. The Puerto Rican Pill Trials: A Historical Look at Epistemic Injustice  
 
From 1952-1960 a series of birth control trials were conducted in Puerto Rico under the 
supervision of Dr. John Rock. This was the first large scale testing that was done on the 
pill, given to more than 220 women on the island for at least one year, but in some 
cases up to three. Puerto Rico was chosen, not only because of its proximity to the 
United States, but also because there were no laws against contraception and there were 
already established birth control clinics.4 The history of these clinics is a different issue 
entirely, products of imperialism invading the country of Puerto Rico in an attempt to 
control the population of the island by sterilization; however, the already established 
imperialist framework can help us to understand why Puerto Rico was chosen in the 
first place. A 1953 article published by the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science outlined the prospects of birth control in Puerto Rico outlined exactly why it 
was that the small island needed methods of contraceptives during that specific period 
of time. An excerpt from the article reads, “with a quarter of its population illiterate, 
with an annual per capita income around $400, and with about 85 percent of its people 
Roman Catholic, the prospects for birth control in Puerto Rico would seem 
negligible.”5 
 
Stycos and Hill then go on to explain three important aspects of changing Puerto Rican 
culture that necessitate the need for the introduction of more birth control clinics as well 
as means of contraception. The first is “indirect propaganda” from the government that 
                                                          
3 Bar On, Bat-Ami. “Marginality and Epistemic Privilege.” In Feminist Epistemologies, 83-100. 
New York: Routledge, 1993. 
4 Knowles, Jon.”The Birth Control Pill: A History." 2013. Accessed November 22, 2014. 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/1213/9611/6329/pillhistory.pdf.  
5 Stycos, J. Mayone, and Reuben Hill.”The Prospects of Birth Control in Puerto Rico."American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 285 (1953): 137-44. Accessed November 22, 2014. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1029126.  
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had “largely dispelled ignorance of the possibility of contraception” (note, the fabrication 
of knowledge passed down to citizens by the central power was taken as a truth simply 
because of the authority said truth came from). Second, though a majority of the 
population identified as Catholic, this didn’t impact their views on the use of birth 
control. And lastly, the shifting of cultural ideals and social patterns directly encouraged 
having a small family.6 Not only was Puerto Rico an ideal nation to begin the first 
impactful trials of the pill with, but it was also seen as an undeveloped nation that needed 
to be brought up to par with the Western standard of living. Marginalization had already 
occurred through the implementation of birth control clinics in Puerto Rico by Western 
nations in order to curb population growth via sterilization, directly contributing to how it 
was the women involved with the Puerto Rican Pill Trial were treated.  
 
Thirteen years after the trials took place Dr. Helen Rodriguez noticed a similarity 
between the process of sterilizing Puerto Rican women and the pill trials. Rodriguez 
was trained as a pediatrician in Puerto Rico and spent the 1960’s working in clinics on 
the island before moving back to the United States and becoming a Puerto Rican 
healthcare activist. In a 1973 radio interview she was asked specifically about medical 
experiments that had been done in Puerto Rico, specifically those done on women. Not 
only does she observe that the dose of estrogen in the pills given to the Puerto Rican 
women was almost ten times the normal amount, but that this specific factor alone 
increased the “dangers of blood coagulation, or possible later malignancies.”7 Under 
the high dose given to the women involved with the Puerto Rican Pill Trial side effects 
included dizziness, nausea, headaches, and vomiting. Such high doses also increased 
the “likelihood and severity” of such side effects as well as “very serious risks, such as 
heart attack and stroke.”8 Rodriguez also speculated that informed consent was not 
accurately obtained. No written information was given to the women who participated 
in the trials and they were also not required to sign any sort of document of consent.9  
 
Of course, these side effects were not accurately dealt with until ten years later after the 
pill had been produced and marketed for consumption within the United States.10 
Women from the Puerto Rican trial that complained of such discomforts were 
dismissed and the explanation was made that there must have been something wrong 
with them prior to the birth control trial. Their credibility was diminished, even 
destroyed, simply because they were women of an “undeveloped” nation that was 
already feeling the affects of an imperialistic framework. The women involved with 
these trials experienced epistemic injustice on a drastic scale. Not only was their word 
                                                          
6 Ibid, 137. 
7“Sterilization in Puerto Rico." Off Our Backs 4, no. 11 (1973): 9-10. Accessed November 22, 
2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25772013. 
8 Knowles. 
9 Off Our Backs, 10. 
10 Knowles. 
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discounted as important, but also their knowledge of themselves was seen as irrelevant 
to the greater outcome of the trial. Knowledge about one’s body should be of primary 
importance; however, it seems as though we live in a world structured around the 
notion that those in an authoritative position know what’s best for us, even when that 
comes to our bodies and our minds. The Puerto Rican Pill Trials show just how 
pervasive epistemic injustice is, how the mere notion of it is entirely systemic and leads 
to greater oppression of already marginalized bodies. Since the women involved in 
these trials did not have a degree of epistemic privilege, they were discounted as 
knowers and denied proper recognition, further contributing the oppression they were 
already experiencing under the established imperialist framework.  
 
 
III. Recognition and Subjecthood  
 
The women who took part in the Puerto Rican Pill Trials didn’t just experience 
epistemic injustice. Asserting such would be a gross misunderstanding. Whenever 
epistemic injustice takes place, it necessarily follows that recognition is denied. 
Because those that are in authority have the ability to structure the world as they see fit 
and fabricate and alter specific knowledge claims, it can be said that authoritative 
figures have a complete monopolization over knowledge within their particular society. 
Groups of bodies that are commonly seen as outliers have little to no say in the 
structuring of the world and their claims are often presumed to be false on face value 
alone. Puerto Rican women that took part in the 1952 trials of the pill did not have the 
authority to have their claims to side effects of the drug heard. Instead, the world was 
structured around them by the doctors that initiated the trial regardless of what the 
women had to say about the discomforts they were experiencing. The exiting 
framework of cultural imperialism served to discount the expression and knowledge 
claims of the women involved, instead making the excuse that there must be something 
fundamentally wrong with them—that their subjecthood needed to be questioned.  
 
As Jane McConkey points out in Knowledge and Acknowledgement: Epistemic 
Injustice as a Problem of Recognition, “under conditions of cultural imperialism, 
dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one’s own group 
invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as Other.”11 
This directly places epistemic injustice in the realm of recognition. Whenever epistemic 
injustice occurs, it can also be said that an Otherization of a marginalized body occurs 
as well. After all, as Simone de Beauvoir claims in The Second Sex, “Otherness is a 
                                                          
11 McConkey, Jane.”Knowledge and Acknowledgement: Epistemic Injustice as a Problem of 
Recognition." Politics 24, no. 3 (2004): 198-205. 
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fundamental category of human thought.”12 The need to gain recognition by further 
dominating and oppressing an already marginalized fringe group is something that is 
inherent within the current power structure—a central focus of almost complete power 
and authority whose greatest tool lies in the ability to engage in the oppression of others 
through a dangerous monopolization of knowledge.  
 
McConkey asserts that “a knower is not credible unless they are understood as such by 
society, a person cannot even begin to count as a knower unless their knowledge claims 
can be acknowledged.”13 This acknowledgement lies solely in relation to one’s own 
epistemic community as well as the larger social world with which the knower at 
question interacts. When acknowledgment is denied, credibility is destroyed, and 
claims are rejected based on a knower’s perceived membership of a specific 
marginalized group, recognition is completely taken away. Under epistemic injustice 
the subjecthood of a person is rendered almost useless by the greater society they 
belong to, denying them the ability to engage in a process of true determination of the 
Self. Instead, since their word is constantly seen as unreliable and invalid, the 
Otherness that has been prescribed to them by greater society is internalized, wrecking 
any form of recognition they could gain from, not only their epistemic community, but 
from themselves as well.  
 
Knowledge is an important aspect of society. Every person within a State is concerned 
with how their understandings of and interactions with the social world affect their 
ability to create their own subject and be recognized as such. When knowledge 
claimants are continuously discredited based on their membership to a marginalized 
and, therefore, stereotyped group, their ability to recognize and determine their own 
subjecthood is denied. Epistemic injustice should be considered a fundamental part of 
the oppression done by those in authoritative positions—by those who are closer to the 
central power—because it contributes directly to the Otherization of those of us who 
find ourselves further from the central focus of power.  
 
                                                          
12 De Beauvoir, Simone.”Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Sex." In Princeton Readings in 
Political Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
13 McConkey, 203. 
